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Abstract—With the pervasive use of smartphones that sense,
collect, and process valuable information about the environment,
ensuring location privacy has become one of the most important
concerns in the modern age.
A few recent research studies discuss the feasibility of pro-
cessing sensory data gathered by a smartphone to locate the
phone’s owner, even when the user does not intend to share
his location information, e.g., when the user has turned off
the Global Positioning System (GPS) on the device. Previous
research efforts rely on at least one of the two following
fundamental requirements, which impose significant limitations
on the adversary: (i) the attacker must accurately know either the
user’s initial location or the set of routes through which the user
travels and/or (ii) the attacker must measure a set of features,
e.g., device acceleration, for different potential routes in advance
and construct a training dataset.
In this paper, we demonstrate that neither of the above-
mentioned requirements is essential for compromising the user’s
location privacy. We describe PinMe, a novel user-location
mechanism that exploits non-sensory/sensory data stored on the
smartphone, e.g., the environment’s air pressure and device’s
timezone, along with publicly-available auxiliary information,
e.g., elevation maps, to estimate the user’s location when all
location services, e.g., GPS, are turned off. Unlike previously-
proposed attacks, PinMe neither requires any prior knowledge
about the user nor a training dataset on specific routes. We
demonstrate that PinMe can accurately estimate the user’s
location during four activities (walking, traveling on a train,
driving, and traveling on a plane). We also suggest several
defenses against the proposed attack.
Index Terms—Air pressure, auxiliary information, elevation
map, , navigational map, privacy, sensor, smartphone, tracking.
I. INTRODUCTION
With widespread use of smartphones that can sense and
collect environment-related data and process them to extract
valuable information about the environment, ensuring privacy
has become one of the most important challenges in the mod-
ern era. Indeed, rapid technological advances in electronics
and mobile devices have led (and will continue to lead) to
serious concerns about privacy in general, and location privacy
in particular [1].
Modern smartphones are equipped with many compact
sensors, e.g., accelerometers and barometers, and powerful
communication capabilities in order to offer a variety of
services. Although the numerous smartphone applications
make the user’s life convenient, they can also intention-
ally/unintentionally reveal personal or corporate secrets [2]–
[9]. In particular, they can leak valuable data about the user’s
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whereabouts, which can be processed to extract contextual
information about his habits, regular activities, and even
relationships [10], [11]. Moreover, disclosure of the user’s
location may expose him to location-based spams, scams, and
advertisements, or make him a victim of blackmail or violence
[1], [12].
With the emergence of enormous privacy concerns in the
last decade, several privacy policies have been put in place to
force organizations to take their users’ privacy into account.
In particular, the U.S. Congress introduced the Geolocation
Privacy and Surveillance Act in 2011 to provide a legal frame-
work for giving government agencies, commercial entities, and
private citizens clear guidelines for when and how geolocation
information can be accessed and used [13]. As a result, in all
modern smartphones, an application must explicitly ask for
the user’s permission if it wants to access location services,
e.g., GPS [14], [15].
A few recent research efforts have demonstrated the feasibil-
ity of locating smartphone owners without accessing GPS [9],
[16]–[18]. For instance, Michalevsky et al. proposed PowerSpy
[17], a mechanism that locates the user by processing the
power consumption of the smartphone, when the user travels
through a known set of routes. PowerSpy was able to detect
45% of driving trajectories in the best-case scenario. Han et
al. showed that accelerometer readings can be used to estimate
the trajectory and starting point of an individual who is driving
[19]. They were able to return two clusters of possible starting
points (each including five points) such that the starting point
was within one of the clusters.
The successful demonstration of such attacks against lo-
cation privacy suggests that revealing the user’s location by
processing presumably non-critical data is feasible. How-
ever, all previously-suggested attacks against location privacy
mainly rely on at least one of the three following fundamental
requirements.
• Req. 1: The attacker must either know the user’s initial
location (the exact GPS coordinates) or has substantial
prior knowledge of the area through which the victim
is traveling, e.g., the attacker assumes that the victim is
traveling through a small set of known routes.
• Req. 2: The attacker must measure a set of features, e.g.,
power consumption [17], for different potential routes in
advance and construct an attack-specific training dataset.
• Req. 3: The sensory data must be continuously collected
at a high sampling rate, e.g., 30Hz [19], [20], which is
significantly higher than the sampling rate needed for a
majority of benign applications.
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2The first two requirements significantly limit the attacker’s
ability to locate the user in realistic scenarios, and the third
can raise suspicion, making it easier to detect the attack [21].
Even with these requirements, previous attacks offer a rough
estimation of the user’s trajectory, as discussed later in Section
VI.
This paper aims to demonstrate that none of the above-
mentioned requirements is needed to accurately track the user
when all location services, e.g., GPS, are off. We propose
an attack on location privacy in which: (i) the attacker needs
neither the user’s initial location nor a small set of potential
travel routes, (ii) he is not burdened with the construction of
an attack-specific database, and (iii) he does not collect data
at a high sampling rate, e.g., as demonstrated later, a sampling
rate of 0.1Hz is sufficient to track the user when he is driving.
The first two characteristics of the proposed scheme enable
an attacker to launch an attack on a large scale, when he has
no prior knowledge about users’ initial locations or the set of
routes through which he travels. The third one makes the attack
invisible to known defenses that detect the maliciousness of
an application based on its high sampling frequency, e.g., the
defense in [21].
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
1) We develop PinMe, a location mechanism that en-
ables an attacker to accurately locate the user using
sensory/non-sensory data along with publicly-available
auxiliary information.
2) We demonstrate how different types of seemingly-
benign non-sensory data, e.g., the smartphone’s time-
zone and network status, and sensory data, e.g., air
pressure and heading, can offer sensitive information to
the attacker who aims to locate the user.
3) We introduce five sources of publicly-available auxiliary
information (public maps, transportation time tables,
airports’ specification databases, weather reports, and
trains’ heading dataset) that can be used in conjunction
with smartphone’s data to develop an attack against
location privacy.
4) Unlike previously-proposed attacks [17], [19] that are
focused on a single activity, e.g., driving, we demon-
strate how a user can be located when he is: (i) traveling
on a plane, (ii) walking, (iii) traveling on a train, and
(iv) driving. As far as we know, PinMe is the first
smartphone-based user location mechanism that aims to
locate the user while undertaking different activities.
5) In order to evaluate the accuracy of the proposed loca-
tion mechanism, we collect real-world data using three
devices (iPhone 6, iPhone 6S, and Galaxy S4 i9500).
6) We evaluate the accuracy of PinMe for estimating
the user’s location using two real-world datasets. We
demonstrate that, unlike previous attacks, PinMe is able
to accurately and uniquely return a trajectory that is
comparable to GPS-based trajectory (Fig. 1).
7) Finally, we discuss defenses against the proposed attack.
To sum up, PinMe aims to offer a comprehensive (i.e.,
covering multiple activities) attack that minimizes the need
to have prior knowledge about the user, removes the need for
Fig. 1: PinMe could find and return the user’s trajectory
without accessing GPS data. The green and orange lines
demonstrate the estimated paths traversed by the user during
driving and walking, respectively. The black line is the actual
user trajectory reported by GPS data.
building attack-specific datasets, and uses the interdependence
between seemingly-independent activities to obtain an accu-
rate user trajectory. Our end-to-end evaluation demonstrates
that PinMe works accurately (comparable to GPS) in real-
world scenarios. As discussed in Section V, protecting the
user against this attack can be very challenging due to its
robustness against potential sources of noise and the low
sampling rate required for the attack.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II provides the problem definition and discusses how the
attacker can acquire the data needed for the proposed attack.
Section III discusses PinMe comprehensively and describes
different sources of information and algorithms used to imple-
ment the attack. Section IV describes how we collected real-
world data for evaluating PinMe and examines the accuracy of
the proposed location mechanism. Section V suggests several
countermeasures for mitigating the risks of the proposed
attack. Section VI summarizes related work. Section VII
discusses the limitations of PinMe and describes how we
used the interdependence between activities to facilitate (and
enhance the accuracy of) our proposed attack and how PinMe
can be used as an alternative to GPS in autonomous cars
to enhance their security. Finally, Section VIII concludes the
paper.
II. THREAT MODEL
In this section, we first describe several consequences of
launching an attack against location privacy, and provide a
brief description of our proposed attack. Then, we discuss how
attackers can acquire the data that are required to launch the
proposed attack.
A. Problem definition
Today’s smartphones are equipped with several low-power
high-precision sensors and powerful processors that enable
3them to continuously collect and process environment-related
data. As a result, a modern smartphone carries several types of
valuable data. Such data can be processed to reveal sensitive
information about the phone’s user. For example, the contex-
tual information attached to movement traces conveys much
about the user’s interests, activities, and even relationships [1].
Launching an attack against location privacy can expose the
user to unwanted advertisement, spams, or scams. Moreover,
it can lead to several consequences, ranging from the uncom-
fortable feeling of being monitored to unwanted disclosure
of personal activities or even actual physical harm [22]. For
example, it may be embarrassing for a user if his/her relatives
find out that he/she went to certain places, e.g., an HIV
clinic or an abortion clinic. While these consequences are a
direct result of manual inspection of leaked location-related
information, several recent research efforts have investigated
the feasibility of extracting other valuable information from
the user’s location-related information. For example, early
research work in this area [23] explored the possibility of
inferring information about the user’s habits and detecting
places important to him, e.g., his home and office, from GPS
traces.
Although the importance of preventing location services,
e.g., GPS, from leaking unwanted information has become
clear, the extent of location-related information that can be
inferred from presumably non-critical data, such as movement-
related data, e.g., acceleration and heading, and environment-
related data, e.g., air pressure, is neither well-known nor well-
understood. This paper aims to demonstrate the possibility of
accurately locating the smartphone’s user using such presum-
ably non-critical data stored on the phone.
B. Acquiring data
The attacker can obtain the smartphone’s non-sensory and
sensory data, which are required for the proposed attack,
using one of the two following approaches:
Approach 1: Utilizing a malicious application
Smartphones are characterized by their ability to run third-
party applications. Both Android and iOS offer hundreds of
thousands of applications through their application markets.
Such markets benefit developers by simplifying application
sales and distribution. The existence of huge application
markets might also enable cyber criminals to distribute
a malicious application in an attempt to steal personal
information stored on the phone, e.g., credit card numbers
and personal photos. Fortunately, such critical information is
commonly protected by the smartphone’s operating system,
and users are also very careful about sharing their personal
information with third parties. However, several types of non-
sensory/sensory data, which are stored on the smartphone,
are either loosely-protected or not protected at all, e.g.,
gyroscope, accelerometer, barometer, and magnetometer
measurements are accessible by an application installed on
the smartphone without requiring user’s approval. As a result,
a malicious application that is installed on the smartphone
and runs in the background can continuously capture such
data without arousing suspicion.
Approach 2: Accessing a presumably-trusted application
server
Several trusted applications upload their data to the cloud.
For example, the majority of fitness monitoring applications
continuously collect and upload the user’s data to the cloud.
The collection of the data in the cloud enables the user to
access and share his fitness statistics with his family, friends,
and peer groups. A recent report by the mHealth development
industry [24] estimates that there are about 100,000 applica-
tions dedicated to health and fitness. Such applications can,
without arousing suspicion, collect and upload a significant
amount of valuable non-sensory/sensory data, which can be
post-processed to infer critical information about the user. In
particular, as we demonstrate later, an attacker, who can access
such application databases, e.g., the application development
company or an individual who has access to the data shared
by the user, can post-process such data to estimate the past
locations of the user.
Our approach: In this paper, we assume that the proposed
location mechanism obtains the required non-sensory/sensory
data using the first approach. In fact, we installed an ap-
plication on the smartphone that continuously collects the
required data. We assume that the application does not have
access to GPS. Moreover, the application has no permission
to query the identity of visible cellular base stations or the
service set identifier (SSID) of visible WiFi networks. To
sum up, we assume that the attacker only uses presumably
non-critical data collected by a malicious application along
with publicly-available auxiliary information to reveal the
user’s location. The proposed attack does not rely on careless
behaviors of the user (e.g., a careless user may just accept
all permission requests, including a request to access GPS
data, without carefully reviewing them). In fact, PinMe aims
to demonstrate the feasibility of a privacy attack against
careful users (for example, a user who checks what he shares
with third-party applications, minimizes the access level of
untrusted applications, and even turns off all location services
when he travels through sensitive routes to ensure his location
privacy). The introduction of this attack sheds light on the
possibility that a third party, which has an application on the
user’s smartphone, can potentially extract his sensitive location
information without asking for any permission (except Internet
connectivity that is needed for sending either raw data or
inferred location to the third party).
III. THE PROPOSED LOCATION MECHANISM
In this section, we describe PinMe, the proposed location
mechanism. First, we introduce the main sources of informa-
tion that are given to PinMe as inputs. Second, we describe
various algorithms that we have designed and implemented to
locate the user in scenarios involving different activities.
A. Sources of information
PinMe exploits two main sources of information: (i) non-
sensory/sensory data collected by the smartphone, and (ii)
publicly-available auxiliary information. Next, we describe
each source in more detail.
4TABLE I: Smartphone’s Non-Sensory Data
Non-sensory data Description
Timezone (TZ) Specifies the device’s current timezone (i.e., a region including the
cities/states that have the same time)
Device’s address (IP) Provides the phone’s IP address when it is connected to the Internet
Network status (NS) Specifies whether the smartphone is connected to a WiFi or a cellular network
TABLE II: Smartphone’s Sensory Data
Sensor Sensory data
Accelerometer Magnitudes of the acceleration in three-dimensional space
Magnetometer Angle between device’s actual orientation relative to true north (heading)
Barometer The environment’s air pressure
1) Smartphone’s non-sensory/sensory data: An application
installed on the smartphone can obtain several types of non-
sensory and sensory data without requesting user’s approval.
Non-sensory data provide general information about the de-
vice, e.g., the version of the device’s operating system, current
timezone, IP address, the amount of available storage, and
network status. Table I summarizes different forms of non-
sensory data that PinMe uses to locate the user during different
activities, along with a short description of each.
In addition to the non-sensory data, sensory data collected
by the smartphone’s built-in sensors provide valuable infor-
mation about the user’s movements and the environment in
which the smartphone is located. Table II includes different
sensors that are accessed by PinMe and sensory data provided
by each sensor.
2) Publicly-available auxiliary information: The proposed
user location mechanism uses several types of auxiliary
information to narrow the area of interest. In particular, it
utilizes five main types of information: (i) public maps, (ii)
weather reports, (iii) airports’ specifications database, (iv)
trains’ heading dataset, and (v) transportation timetables.
Next, we describe each information type.
Public maps: The proposed mechanism uses two widely-
known map types:
1. Navigational map: A navigational map mainly depicts
roads, highways, and transportation links. Such a map can
specify a large set of possible routes through which the
user can travel. PinMe uses OpenStreetMap (OSM) [25]
maps. OSM maps can be downloaded as Extensible Markup
Language (XML) files that can be easily processed and
modified.
2. Elevation map: An elevation map contains the elevation,
i.e., the height above or below the Earth’s sea level, of
all points on the Earth’s surface. Several commercial, e.g.,
Google Map API [26], and governmental services, e.g.,
U.S. Geological Survey Maps [27], provide comprehensive
elevation data of the world surface. For instance, the Google
Map API offers a free and publicly-available interface that
can be used by developers to fetch the elevation of a point of
interest, given its longitude and latitude.
Weather reports: Weather reports offer different types of
information collected by weather stations. We use weather
reports provided by The Weather Channel [28]. They include
temperature, humidity, and air pressure readings at weather
stations, and the actual elevation of the weather station.
PinMe uses weather reports to estimate the elevation of
the smartphone using its air pressure reading. The use of
weather reports is essential for accurately estimating the
elevation of the smartphone since the air pressure readings
are highly dependent on both elevation and weather conditions.
Airports’ specifications databases: PinMe uses OpenFlights
[29], the most comprehensive freely-available airports’
specifications database, which includes elevation information,
GPS coordinates, and timezone of 9541 different airports
around the world.
Trains’ heading databases: Trains’ heading database is
a simple database that includes the trains’ directions at
each station. We have constructed this database based on
Google Map [30]. For each train station considered in
our experiments, we extract different potential movement
directions based on the illustration of the stations’ tracks
on Google Map. Note that each track in a station can have
two possible headings corresponding to a train entering and
leaving the station.
Transport timetables: Transport timetables contain
information about service times to assist passengers in
planning their trip. A timetable lists the times when a service
is scheduled to arrive (depart) at (from) specified locations1.
The two most common types of transport timetables are flight
and train timetables. These timetables are often available
in a variety of electronic formats, e.g., PDF files, and are
commonly posted on airports’/stations’ websites. They are
also accessible through various APIs.
B. Main Algorithms
Next, we describe the main algorithms that we have
designed and implemented for estimating the user’s location.
PinMe is implemented using Python and Matlab, and our
1The actual destination/departure time may vary from the scheduled
destination/departure time due to transportation delays. However, accurate
information about the service is added to transport timetables after departure.
5prototype implementation includes about 2000 lines of
code. It has three main steps: (i) pre-processing, (ii) activity
classification, and (iii) location estimation. Algorithm I:
PinMe provides a simplified pseudo-code of the proposed
location mechanism. Next, we describe each step in more
detail.
Algorithm I: PinMe
Given: The smartphone’s sensory data (D), non-sensory data
(IP, NS, and TZ), and all sources of publicly-available aux-
iliary information (allAux: public maps, weather reports,
airports’ specifications databases, trains’ heading databases,
transport timetables)
//Step 1: Pre-processing
lastWiFiIP ← findLastWiFiIP (NS, IP )
city ← IPGeolocation(lastWiFiIP )
aux← getAux(allAux, city)
chunks[]← streamPartitioning(D)
//Step 2: Activity classification
acts[]← activityClassifier(chunks[])
//Step 3: Location estimation
for each activity in acts[]
[city, loc[i]]← Estimator(chunks[i], acts[i], aux, city)
end
return loc[]
1) Pre-processing: In this step, PinMe first recognizes the
last city in which the user was connected to a WiFi network
and gets the required sources of auxiliary information for the
potential city of interest. Second, it breaks the sensory data
into several chunks so that each chunk is associated with a
single activity.
1. Inferring the city: When the smartphone is connected
to a WiFi network, IP geolocation techniques can process
the device’s current IP address and return the city in which
the smartphone is located. Although such techniques can
accurately locate the smartphone when it is connected to a
WiFi network, they usually fail to locate it when connected to
a cellular Internet network [31], [32].
Both iOS and Android allow an installed application to
determine whether the smartphone is connected to a WiFi or
a cellular network. In order to find the last city in which the
user was connected to a WiFi network, PinMe processes the
previous readings of smartphone’s Network Status (NS) and
IP address to find the last IP address of the smartphone when it
was connected to a WiFi network, and feeds that IP address to
IPGeolocation(...). Then, PinMe obtains different types of
auxiliary information about the city, e.g., its maps. PinMe does
not assume that the user remains in the same city. However, it
starts tracking the user from that city. In fact, the user’s current
city becomes regularly updated based on his past movements.
2. Data stream partitioning: In the pre-processing step,
PinMe also breaks the long data stream collected over a long
time period, e.g., a day, into data chunks so that each chunk
only includes the data associated with one activity. Based on
our empirical analyses, a simple pattern in the acceleration
data can indicate that a new activity has commenced: in
the transition from one activity to another, the accelerometer
measures a series of large absolute acceleration readings
(larger than 25 m/s2) in a short time frame due to the fact
that there is always a transition from standing (sitting) position
to sitting (standing) position between two activities. This is
the pattern PinMe uses to break the data stream into small
data chunks. Unfortunately, a similar pattern might be present
in the acceleration data collected during a single activity,
e.g., when the user suddenly moves or falls. Therefore, it is
possible that PinMe falsely detects the start of a new activity
even when the user’s activity has not changed. However,
this does not negatively impact the accuracy of the location
mechanism because as described later, for all activities, the
activity classifier accurately detects the user’s activity and
PinMe can merge consecutive data chunks into one data chunk
when the user’s activity has not changed.
2) Activity classification: In this step, the activity classifier
aims to specify the user’s activities. Throughout the paper, we
assumed that the user takes part in one of the four activities
mentioned earlier: driving, traveling on a plane, traveling
on a train, and walking. To classify these activities, we
have implemented two classification methods: (i) a traditional
machine learning-based method that relies on building models
to label the user’s activities, and (ii) a tailored algorithm
designed to deduce the user’s activities based on the physical
characteristics of each activity.
To the best of our knowledge, the activity classifiers utilized
in PinMe are the first activity classification mechanisms that
use air pressure data as a primary source of data for activity
classification, and the first to use macro-level features, e.g.,
the number of turns and the rate of change during a turn,
of heading data. Our examination of real-world data shows
that air pressure and heading can offer valuable discriminatory
information for activity classification.
Fig. 2 illustrates how the smartphone’s heading changes in
four data chunks collected during different activities. Among
all activities, traveling on a train is the only one in which the
smartphone observes no significant change in heading data.
Note that heading data are measured clockwise from true north
and vary from 0◦ to 359◦.
Fig. 3 shows how air pressure changes during different
activities. Traveling on a plane is the only activity in which
a fast significant drop in the environment’s air pressure was
noticed.
Next, we describe each of the above-mentioned methods.
Method 1: Machine learning-based classification
A classical approach to implementing an activity classi-
fication mechanism is to devise a scheme based on a su-
pervised machine learning algorithm, which builds a model
using labeled training data. The training dataset used for
activity classification is not attack-specific (attacker can collect
the required data using his own smartphone while traveling
through unknown paths). This mechanism consists of three
steps: feature extraction, binary classification, and decision
making. Upon receiving a data chunk, the feature extraction
step generates a feature vector. This vector is then sent to
four binary classifiers, each trained to only detect a single
6Fig. 2: Heading data collected during four different activities.
Heading data are measured clockwise from true north and
varies from 0◦ to 359◦. The smartphone’s heading only slightly
changes when the user is traveling on the train (within a 30-
degree range).
Fig. 3: Air pressure data collected during four different activ-
ities.
activity. Finally, the decision making step returns the user’s
activity based on the outputs of the binary classifiers. Next,
we discuss how each of these steps is implemented in our
proposed scheme.
1. Feature extraction: Previous research efforts [33]–[36]
have suggested a variety of features that can be extracted from
acceleration data and be used to classify various user activities.
In our mechanism, we use several features extracted from
heading and air pressure data along with a few previously-
proposed acceleration-related features. Each feature vector
includes: time-domain features (mean, median, and standard
deviation) and frequency-domain features (principal frequency
and spectral energy) extracted from each dimension of ac-
celeration readings, time-domain features (mean, median, and
standard deviation, and range) from air pressure, and macro-
level features (number of turns and maximum rate of change in
heading over 1-second windows) from magnetometer readings.
2. Binary classifiers: In order to implement binary classi-
fiers, we use Linear Support Vector Machine (LSVM) [37].
LSVM is one of the simplest, yet powerful, binary classi-
fication methods. The basic concept behind an LSVM is to
find a hyperplane that separates the n-dimensional data into
two classes. When no prior knowledge about the dataset is
available, LSVMs usually demonstrate promising results and
generalize well. They construct a decision boundary with the
largest possible distance to data points. The binary classifiers
used in the proposed scheme are trained so that each classifier
can only recognize a single activity.
3. Final decision making: The final decision making step
receives the classifiers’ outputs, and returns an output as
follows: if only one classifier detects the activity, it returns
the activity associated with that classifier, otherwise, it returns
a message stating that the activity is not recognized.
Method 2: Tailored algorithm
In addition to the machine-learning based method, we have
developed a simple, yet accurate, classification algorithm. The
simple tailored algorithm classifies the user’s activities based
on each activity’s physical characteristics. We examine several
data streams collected by the smartphone during different user
activities. For each activity, we extract a set of characteristics
that only pertains to that activity. Table III summarizes these
characteristics.
3) Location estimation: In order to estimate the user’s
location, we have implemented four algorithms, referred to
as location estimators. Upon detection of the user’s activ-
ities (acts[]) using the activity classifier, for each activity,
PinMe calls Estimator(...) that executes one of the four
location estimators to find the user’s locations. For each
location estimator, Table IV summarizes the required non-
sensory/sensory data and auxiliary information given to it and
the outputs provided by each algorithm. Next, we describe the
four proposed location estimators in more detail.
Algorithm 1: carTracker: Unlike the method in [19] that
uses very noisy accelerometer measurements, this algorithm
relies on the sensory data collected by the magnetometer and
barometer (heading and air pressure) to provide a very accurate
tracking mechanism. It has three main steps:
Step 1: Map construction: Prior to tracking the user, PinMe
constructs a labeled directed graph G using both elevation and
navigational maps of the city so that its vertices and edges
represent the intersections and roads between intersections,
respectively. Labels of vertices are the elevation of the in-
tersections extracted from the navigational map and the angle
between roads connecting to that intersection.
Step 2: Pruning set of probable candidates: At each moment
of time, the algorithm has an array of trees (the set of
probable paths with different starting points, referred to as
P ) where each tree represents a sequence of intersections on
the navigational map. Prior to the attack, this array contains
all vertices of G, indicating that the first turn can be at any
intersection. Upon the detection of a turn (e.g., an almost 90-
degree change in the heading data), the algorithm prunes and
updates the set of trees as follows. For each probable path
(each tree in set P ), it drops the path if all neighbors of its
last vertex do not meet the following conditions: the elevation
or relative changes in the heading direction of all neighbors
(represented as labels of vertices in graph G) do not match
their values extracted from sensory data.
Step 3: Updating the remaining candidates: At each turn,
if a tree is not dropped from the set, the algorithm adds
all neighbors (intersections) that meet the above-mentioned
conditions to the tree. Eventually, it sorts paths in P based on
their error, defined as the weighted sum of absolute differences
7TABLE III: Discriminatory characteristics of each activity
Activity Characteristics
Driving Irregular positive (negative) accelerations as the driver accelerates (brakes)
Specific changes (around 90 degrees) in the smartphone’s heading as the car turns
Traveling on a plane Rapid changes in the timezone
Significant increase/decrease of air pressure in a short time frame
Traveling on a train Regular positive (negative) accelerations in one direction as the train leaves (reaches) a station
No significant changes in the smartphone’s heading
Walking Very frequent periodic acceleration changes in one direction, no matter how the device is held
TABLE IV: The required non-sensory/sensory data and auxiliary information given to each location estimator and the outputs
provided by each algorithm
Location estimator Inputs Outputs
Algorithm 1: carTracker Air pressure, heading, public maps, The initial and last locations and cities,
and weather reports and the car’s estimated trajectory
Algorithm 2: planeTracker Air pressure, acceleration, TZ, weather reports, The destination and departure airports
airports’ specifications databases,
and flight timetables
Algorithm 3: trainTracker Acceleration, heading, train timetables, The destination and departure stations
and trains’ heading databases
Algorithm 4: walkingUserTracker Air pressure, acceleration, heading, weather reports, and public maps The user’s last location and trajectory
between the extracted features from the sensory data and
their actual values reported in navigational/elevation data, and
returns the most probable path from the set (the path with the
lowest error).
Although the number of intersections of a city is large,
we observe based on experimental results that the number of
intersections that can be a part of a candidate path drops
extremely fast from thousands to only a few after the first few
turns. As a result, the size of set P is reduced quickly as
the algorithm removes many impossible candidates when they
become inconsistent with new data. This is demonstrated later
in Section IV.
Note: Although there is a well-known physics equation [38]
for estimating elevation (relative to sea level) based on air
pressure measurements alone, it does not provide an accu-
rate estimation of the elevation in practice since barometer
measurements significantly depend on weather conditions. To
accurately estimate the elevation (Hturn) of a turn point,
given the air pressure measured at the point (Pturn), PinMe
first extracts the air pressure (Pstation), elevation (Hstation),
temperature information (T ), and humidity (indicated by a
constant C) at city’s weather station, provided by its weather
report, and then uses the following physics equation [39]:
Hturn = Hstation +
T
C
ln(
Pturn
Pstation
) (1)
Algorithm 2: planeTracker: planeTracker first extracts three
features from the raw data provided by the smartphone: (i)
flight time data (takeoff and landing times and flight duration),
(ii) TZ and elevation of the departure airport, and (iii) TZ and
elevation of the destination airport. In order to extract these
features from the raw data, the algorithm first recognizes dif-
ferent aviation phases of the flight (pre-flight, takeoff, cruising,
descending, landing, and taxiing to the gate) by processing
acceleration and elevation data collected by the smartphone
during the flight. Then, it calculates the flight duration as
the time difference between the pre-flight phase (i.e., when
the plane leaves the gate at the departure airport) and taxiing
phase (i.e., when the plane reaches the gate at the destination
airport). Moreover, it stores the device’s air pressure and
TZ in both the pre-flight and taxiing phases. Afterwards, it
calculates the elevations of both departure and destination
airports, given the weather report (including the air pressure
reading at city’s weather station and its elevation data). Then,
it searches through the airports’ specifications database to find
the flight routes, which have the following characteristics: (i)
the TZ of both destination and departure airports reported by
the smartphone matches the ones reported in the database, (ii)
the difference between elevation measured from air pressure
data and elevation extracted from the database is less than a
small threshold, e.g., Televation = 5m, and (iii) the difference
between flight duration measured from acceleration data and
flight duration extracted from the database is less than a certain
threshold, e.g., Tduration = 1h.
Given timetables of probable departure/destination airports,
planeTracker returns the routes for which both takeoff time
and landing time almost match their corresponding times pro-
vided by timetables, e.g., ∆Tlanding,∆Ttakeoff < 1h, where
∆Tlanding/takeoff is the difference between landing/takeoff
times extracted from sensory data and their expected values
in timetables.
Algorithm 3: trainTracker: Acceleration data can reveal
different transportation phases, e.g., when the train leaves or
approaches a station, and the combination of acceleration and
heading data provides an approximation of the train’s heading.
This algorithm has two main steps:
Step 1: Extracting features: It first extracts three features
from the raw acceleration and heading data: (i) travel intervals
(an array T ), defined as the difference between the time the
train leaves a station and the time it reaches the next station,
(ii) departure time Tdeparture that represents when the train left
8the first station, and (iii) train’s heading, i.e., an approximation
of the direction of the train’s movement at the first station.
Step 2: Searching through the timetable: After extracting the
above-mentioned features from the raw data, this algorithm
searches the timetables of city′s stations to find the most
probable route. It first constructs Ttrain for all trains that
already left or will leave the current city around the departure
time (within Tdeparture − 1h to Tdeparture + 1h) as follows:
each Ttrain is itself an array including travel intervals for a
single train. Then, for each Ttrain in the list, it computes the
difference between travel intervals extracted from the sensory
data (T ) and Ttrain, i.e., D =
∑length(T )
n=1 |T [i] − Ttrain[i]|.
If the difference between T and Ttrain is below a certain
threshold (i.e., D < 2mins × length(T )), the route corre-
sponding to Ttrain is added to the set of probable routes (P ).
Then, the algorithm prunes P by removing routes for which
the difference between the trains’ heading extracted from the
sensory data and the actual value of heading reported in trains’
heading database is above a certain threshold (30 degrees).
Finally, from the remaining routes, it returns a single route
corresponding to the lowest D in the set.
Algorithm 4: walkingUserTracker: This algorithm assumes
that the user walks through the walking areas (roads or
sidewalks) of the navigational map. We have implemented two
different versions of the algorithm. The first version searches
through the whole map to find the user’s trajectory. However,
to find the initial location of this activity, the second version
only considers a small area (300m × 300m) on the map
around a given location (in real-world scenarios, this location
is determined by a previous activity). Next, we describe the
first version that has three steps (the second version is similar,
however, it only considers a smaller set of nodes to find the
initial point).
Step 1: Map construction: Prior to the attack, walkingUser-
Tracker constructs a graph G similar to the one generated for
Algorithm 1: carTracker, with a slight difference: the graph
also has a label on each edge that represents the length of
the corresponding road extracted from the navigational map.
Similar to carTracker, the algorithm maintains an array of
trees (the set of probable paths with different starting points,
referred to as P ) where each tree represents a sequence of
intersections on the navigational map.
Step 2: Pruning the set of probable candidates: The al-
gorithm extracts the steps and their direction from the raw
acceleration and heading data and elevation of intersections
from air pressure readings. Upon the detection of a turn (e.g.,
an almost 90-degree change in the heading data), the algorithm
updates the set of trees as follows. For each probable path, it
drops the path if all neighbors of its last vertex do not meet at
least one of the following conditions: (i) all labels of edges that
connect the last vertex to it neighbors (D[i]s) do not match
the estimation of the travelled distance calculated based on
the number of steps (for example, all D[i]s are not within
the range of 0.4m × #steps to 1.2m × #steps), or (ii) the
elevation or relative changes in heading direction of neighbors
do not match their values extracted from sensory data.
Step 3: Updating the remaining candidates: At each turn, if
a tree is not eliminated, the algorithm extends it by adding all
neighbors (intersections) that meet the above conditions. This
algorithm sorts paths P based on their error, defined as the
weighted sum of absolute differences between the extracted
features from the sensory data and their actual values given
by maps, and returns the path with the lowest error.
Note: Although this algorithm uses an estimation of the
distance walked by the user to find the trajectory, it can also
accurately estimate the user’s step size upon the detection
of a unique path. It uses the information gathered in the
last sidewalk/road (e.g., total number of steps) along with
information offered by the navigational map (e.g., the total
length of the last sidewalk/road) to adaptively estimate the
user’s step size. Upon the detection of a unique trajectory, the
estimation of the step size enables the algorithm to accurately
estimate the user’s location on the road.
IV. EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED MECHANISM
In this section, we first describe our data collection proce-
dure. Then, we examine the accuracy of PinMe using real-
world data.
A. Data collection procedure
We start with the description of the data collection proce-
dure.
1) Device characteristics and experimental configurations:
The proposed location mechanism is evaluated on three smart-
phones (Galaxy S4 i9500, iPhone 6, and iPhone 6S). Each
device is equipped with an internal GPS device and several
high-precision sensors including, but not limited to, a 3/6-axis
accelerometer, magnetometer, and barometer.
As mentioned earlier in Section III, PinMe processes various
types of sensory data (air pressure, heading, and acceleration)
and non-sensory data (the device’s TZ, IP, and NS). In order
to collect the required data using Galaxy S4 i9500, we
developed an Android application that continuously records
the non-sensory/sensory readings of the device. Moreover, we
installed a sensor data logger application on both iPhone 6
and iPhone 6s, called SensorLog [40], which continuously
records the required non-sensory/sensory data. In our data
collection procedure, sensory data are collected at the sampling
frequency of 5Hz. In addition to the above-mentioned data,
the applications installed on the smartphones also collect GPS
readings. GPS data are only used to evaluate the accuracy of
PinMe in estimating the user’s location (PinMe does not access
GPS data).
2) Datasets: We constructed two datasets using real-world
data. The first dataset consists of several data chunks, i.e.,
sequences of consecutive readings of non-sensory/sensory
data collected during one activity. The second dataset includes
three non-sensory/sensory data streams collected by the three
under-experiment smartphones for a whole day. Next, we
briefly describe each dataset. During the collection of each
data chunk, the smartphone’s orientation was almost fixed,
however, the actual orientation of the smartphone was
unknown in all cases.
Dataset #1: This dataset consists of 405 data chunks
9collected during different user activities where each data
chunk contains consecutive readings of air pressure, heading,
acceleration, and the device’s TZ, IP, and NS during each
activity. Table V shows the number of collected chunks for
each activity. Next, for each activity, we briefly describe how
we collected real-world data.
TABLE V: Number of data chunks in Dataset #1 for each
activity
Activity Number of data chunks
Driving 271
Traveling on a plane 4
Traveling on a train 30
Walking 100
1. Driving: A user, carrying an iPhone 6, drove in three
different cities. 271 data chunks were collected, where each
chunk contains the smartphone’s data during one driving
period. Table VI shows the cities in which the user drove,
their populations, the state in which each city is located, and
the number of collected data chunks for each city. To provide
a fair evaluation, we tried to collect data chunks from different
areas of these cities (both dense and sparse areas).
TABLE VI: Cities, their populations and state, and the number
of driving chunks for each city
City name Population State Chunks
Princeton 12307 NJ 105
Trenton 84308 NJ 111
Philadelphia 1.5 million PA 55
2. Traveling on a plane: We collected four data chunks when
the user traveled on four different airplanes on four different
flight routes: (i) from Philadelphia to Dallas, (ii) from Dallas
to New York, (iii) from College Station to Dallas, and (iv)
from Dallas to College Station. All four data chunks were
collected using iPhone 6S.
3. Traveling on a train: We collected 30 data chunks using
an iPhone 6s when the user traveled on a train (10 chunks
for Princeton Junction Station to New York, 10 chunks for
Baltimore Penn Station to New York, and 10 chunks for
Washington D.C. Union Station to New York).
4. Walking: We collected 100 data chunks when the user
walked carrying an iPhone 6. These data chunks were
gathered in Princeton.
Dataset #2: This dataset includes three data streams
collected by three users while going through their regular
daily activities. Two users were located in Princeton, NJ and
one user was located in Baltimore, MD. In order to construct
this dataset, we asked the users to choose and carry one of
the three under-experiment smartphones (Galaxy S4 i9500,
iPhone 6, and iPhone 6S).
B. Accuracy evaluation
In the following, we first evaluate the accuracy of the
two main steps of PinMe (activity classification and location
estimation) using Dataset #1. Then, we use Dataset #2 to
provide an end-to-end evaluation.
1) Step-by-step evaluation: Next, we evaluate the accuracy
of the activity classifier and location estimators using Dataset
#1.
Evaluating the activity classifier
We evaluated the two activity classification methods discussed
in Section III using Dataset #1. In the machine-learning based
approach, we used 50% of the collected data chunks for
training the binary classifiers, and tested the accuracy of the
scheme using data not used in the training phase. In the other
approach, we used all data chunks to test the accuracy of
the tailored algorithm. Both methods provided a classification
accuracy of 100%, where classification accuracy is defined
as the ratio of correctly recognized activities to the total
number of activities processed by the activity classifier. A
high classification accuracy was expected since each of the
supported activities (driving, traveling on a plane, traveling
on train, and walking) has unique physical characteristics that
differentiate it from other activities.
Evaluating the location estimators
Next, we examine how accurately the four location estimator
algorithms discussed in Section III can estimate the user’s
location.
Algorithm 1: carTracker: In order to evaluate the accuracy of
carTracker, we used 271 data chunks from Dataset #1, which
were collected in three different cities (Table VI). Next, we
examine how accurately this algorithm can locate the user
when it returns the most probable driving path from the set
of probable driving paths and how the size of the set changes
with respect to the length of the driving path.
Fig. 4 shows the average approximation error with respect
to the length of the driving path, i.e., the number of routes
the driver traverses in one driving period that is equal to the
number of turns plus one. The approximation error is defined
as the distance between the actual location (as provided by
GPS sensor) and the estimated location (as estimated by
PinMe) of the user, divided by the total traveled distance
(computed by processing GPS readings). In our experiments,
the length of the driving path varies between 5 and 18. As
can be seen from this figure, as the length of the driving path
increases, the approximation error of the estimator typically
decreases.
We examined how the number of possible driving paths
decreases when the length of the driving path increases. Fig. 5
illustrates the number of possible driving paths with respect
to the length of the driving path. As can be seen, the number
of possible driving paths drops rapidly as the length of the
driving path increases.
To sum up, as the length of the driving path increases,
PinMe collects more information about the user’s environment,
and as a result, it is more likely to find a unique driving path
on the map.
Algorithm 2: planeTracker: We examined the accuracy of
planeTracker in finding departure and destination airports
using Dataset #1. As shown in Table V, we collected four
data chunks while traveling on a plane. Despite the existence
of potential differences between the approximated values of
10
Fig. 4: Average approximation error with respect to the length
of the driving path. The average approximation error is less
than 1.5% in all cases.
Fig. 5: Number of possible driving paths with respect to the
length of the driving path
takeoff time, landing time, and elevation, and their expected
values reported in airports’ specification database and flight
timetables, planeTracker was able to accurately and uniquely
return both departure and destination airports for all four flight
routes.
For each of the four data chunks, we examined how much
the approximated takeoff time, landing time, and elevation
readings extracted by processing the smartphone’s sensory
data differ from their expected values calculated by process-
ing publicly-available auxiliary data (airports’ specification
database and flight timetables), and noticed that: (i) the average
difference between estimated elevation reported by the smart-
phone and the elevation extracted from airports’ specification
database was 2.3 m, (ii) the average difference between
the estimated flight duration and the actual flight duration
was 4% of the actual duration, (iii) the difference between
approximated takeoff time and the takeoff time reported in
the flight timetable (flight delay) was 17 minutes.
In addition to the above-mentioned analyses, we also ex-
amined the discriminatory power of the features extracted
by planeTracker (flight duration, TZs, and elevations of both
destination and departure airports) using Monte Carlo sim-
ulation methodology [41]. We considered two scenarios: (i)
similar to above-mentioned real-world cases, both departure
and destination airports are unknown and planeTracker returns
the flight route (departure and destination airports), and (ii)
attacker knows the departure airport from a previous activity,
e.g., driving to the airport, and he only wants to identify
the destination airport. For each scenario, we generated 500
random flight routes assuming that (i) for each route, the
difference between the estimated flight duration and actual
flight duration varies between 0% and 10% of the actual du-
ration, and (ii) the difference between the estimated elevation
reported by the smartphone and the elevation extracted from
airports’ specification database varies between 0 m and 5
m. We slightly modified planeTracker so that it returns the
three most probable flight routes using the extracted features
(without even using flight timetables). After finding a set of
probable flight routes, it sorts the routes based on their error,
defined as the weighted sum of absolute differences between
the features (elevation and flight duration) calculated from
sensory data and their expected values extracted from airports’
specifications database.
Fig. 6 demonstrates how accurately planeTracker is able
to find the actual flight route without knowing the departure
airport, where accuracy is defined as the number of cases in
which the actual flight route was among the three returned
flight candidates divided by the total number of trials (500).
Similarly, Fig. 7 shows how accurately planeTracker can find
the destination airport, given the departure airport. Despite
the presence of potential differences between the approxi-
mated duration and elevation and their expected values, in
the majority of cases, planeTracker was able to find a set of
three routes/destination airports that includes the actual flight
route/destination airport, as illustrated in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7,
respectively.
Fig. 6: Accuracy of planeTracker in providing a set of three
potential candidates so that the actual flight route is in the set.
Algorithm 3: trainTracker: As mentioned earlier, train-
Tracker returns both departure and destination stations. We
examined the accuracy of the tracking mechanism in finding
actual traveling routes using the 30 data chunks collected by
the smartphone (10 chunks for Princeton Junction Station to
New York, 10 chunks for Baltimore Penn Station to New York,
and 10 chunks for Washington D.C. Union Station to New
York). Our experimental results demonstrated that trainTracker
was able to accurately identify the user’s travel route in all
trials.
Algorithm 4: walkingUserTracker: As mentioned earlier,
two different versions of Algorithm 4: walkingUserTracker
have been implemented: one that searches the whole map,
and the other one that assumes the initial location is within
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Fig. 7: Accuracy of planeTracker in providing a set of three
potential destination airports (given the departure airport) so
that the actual destination airport is in the set.
a small area (300m × 300m) around the final location of
the last activity. Fig. 8 shows how the number of possible
walking paths will change with respect to the number of
walking steps for the first version of the algorithm. Based
on our empirical results, although the possible number of
candidates is reduced quickly, the possibility of each of them
at each moment of time is similar to the others (i.e., when the
number of steps is small, uniquely distinguishing the actual
path is not feasible). As shown in Fig. 8, in order to return a
unique accurate path, the first version of the algorithm requires
a long stream of sensory data (i.e., the user should walk over
2500 steps). We observed that, in real-world scenarios, users
usually walk shorter distances (including only a few different
roads) preceded by other activities (commonly driving). Thus,
to accurately track the user in real-world scenarios during
multiple activities, we suggest using the second version of
the algorithm that utilizes the data provided by the previous
activity.
Fig. 8: Number of potential candidates with respect to the
number of walking steps
We examined how accurately the second version of
walkingUserTracker estimates the user’s location. Fig. 9 shows
the approximation error for all walking trials with respect to
the number of steps, where approximation error is defined
as the distance between the user’s actual location and the
user’s estimated location (as estimated by PinMe), divided
by the total walking distance. As shown in the figure, the
approximation error was less than 2.5% for all data chunks.
Fig. 9: Approximation error with respect to the number of
walking steps.
2) End-to-end evaluation: In order to provide an end-to-end
evaluation, we evaluated the accuracy of PinMe using Dataset
#2. As discussed in Section III-B3, we have implemented two
different versions of walkingUserTracker. For this evaluation,
we used the second version, which assumes that the user
is within a small area around his vehicle after he leaves
the vehicle. Fig. 10 demonstrates the actual trajectories of
the users’ movements (as provided by GPS sensor) along
with the estimated trajectories (as provided by PinMe). As
illustrated in this figure, for all three data streams, which were
collected by three different users while carrying three different
smartphones, the actual trajectories of the users’ movements
were very similar to the estimated ones provided by PinMe.
However, we observed four mismatch areas (bounded by
red/blue boxes in Fig. 10). In the first and last areas (M1
and M4), the starting point of the actual driving path was
slightly different from the point discovered by PinMe due to
the similarities between two nearby intersections marked on
the map. In two other mismatch areas, PinMe more accurately
located the user than GPS. The GPS trajectory shows that the
user’s vehicle was off the road (M2). Furthermore, it indicates
that the user was off the sidewalk when he was walking
(M3). In these two cases, we checked the validity of PinMe’s
trajectories with the users, and they confirmed that the results
provided by PinMe show the actual trajectory in M2 and M3.
Based on our experimental results, we can say that the
location estimation accuracy of carTracker was independent
of the user’s smartphone and vehicle. This was expected
for two reasons. First, PinMe utilizes sensory data, which
do not correlate with the smartphone model (air pressure,
heading, and acceleration), as opposed to PowerSpy [17]
that uses power consumption, which highly correlates with
the smartphone model. Second, as described in Section III,
carTracker mainly relies on air pressure and heading to track
the vehicle when the user is driving – these data are not
correlated with the vehicle model, as opposed to acceleration
data that are correlated with the vehicle model due to the
existence of vibrations caused by the engine of the running
vehicle [19].
V. COUNTERMEASURES
In this section, we briefly describe several countermeasures
(along with their shortcomings) for mitigating the risks of
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Fig. 10: Trajectories of three different users. Starting from the left and moving to right: (a) the first user was located in
Princeton and carried a Galaxy S4 i9500, (b) the second user was located in Princeton and carried an iPhone 6, and (c) the
third user was located in Baltimore and carried an iPhone 6S. The green and orange lines demonstrate the estimated user’s
paths during driving and walking, respectively. The black line is the actual user’s trajectory reported by GPS data.
attacks against location privacy.
A. Adaptive sampling rate
Limiting the sampling rate of sensors can potentially limit
the amount of information leaked by the smartphone. In
order to briefly discuss how the accuracy of PinMe might
be negatively impacted if the sampling rate decreases, we
examined carTracker using sensory data collected at different
sampling rates. Fig. 11 shows how the average approximation
error of carTracker changes with respect to the sampling
rate. As we decrease the sampling rate, the approximation
error only slightly increases for this algorithm (even when
the sampling rate is around 0.1Hz). However, based on our
empirical results, the accuracy of carTracker suddenly drops
when the sampling rate becomes very low (i.e., below 0.02Hz)
since the algorithm cannot detect the intersection (when the
car turns) anymore. Many benign applications (for example,
fitness tracker [42] and fall detection [43]) require a sampling
frequency larger than 0.1Hz, and thus decreasing the sampling
rate of sensors below 0.1Hz, to prevent a PinMe attack,
would reduce the efficiency, efficacy, and utility of trusted
applications as well.
Utilizing context-aware sampling mechanisms, which can
adaptively control sensor sampling rates, may be an alternative
approach to maximizing utility and minimizing information
leakage. For example, consider a mechanism that changes
the maximum allowable sampling rate of the sensors based
on user’s current activity. Such a mechanism can allow a
fitness tracking application to obtain very frequent samples
from the accelerometer when the user is running and only
allow infrequent sampling when the user is driving.
B. Risk-evaluation mechanism
Generally, a risk-evaluation mechanism aims to share the
smartphone’s data in such a way that certain kinds of infer-
ences cannot be drawn. It examines if a set of sensory/non-
sensory data collected by an application can leak sensitive
information about the user, and blocks an application upon
Fig. 11: Average approximation error of carTracker with
respect to the sampling frequency.
the detection of a potential information leakage. A few recent
research efforts have been geared towards risk-evaluation
mechanisms that can be implemented on the smartphone to
ensure user privacy [21], [44], [45]. For instance, Chakraborty
et al. [45] have proposed ipShield, a framework to control
the sensory data that are accessible by various applications
installed on a smartphone. Their risk-evaluation mechanism
continuously examines what inferences can be made from the
shared sensory/non-sensory information.
Zhang et al. [21] proposed a defense against runtime-
information-gathering attacks in which a malicious app runs
side-by-side with a target application (a victim) and performs
runtime information gathering (RIG). They suggested tem-
porarily stopping the applications that are potentially able
to collect data from a sensitive application or killing appli-
cations that may be collecting side-channel information in
the background while the foreground application performs
sensitive tasks. They discuss two suspicious activities that can
reveal maliciousness of an application: (1) a high sampling
rate needed for continuous monitoring, (2) the presence of a
correlation between an application’s activity and the activity
of a sensitive application. The location estimation algorithms
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described in our paper need a much lower sampling frequency
(for example, as shown earlier, 0.1Hz led to accurate results
for carTracker) than the frequency used in many previous
attacks (for example, ACComplice [19] uses a sampling rate of
30Hz). Therefore, sampling rate cannot be solely used to re-
veal the malicious activity of PinMe. Furthermore, PinMe does
not require any data from other applications since it directly
collects permission-free data, therefore, there is no correlation
between its activity and other applications’ activities. Finally,
their defense relies on monitoring application-specific files,
which are no longer accessible in Android M [46]. Thus, the
approach discussed in [21] does not address PinMe.
C. Sensor data manipulation
Sensor data manipulation enables the user to manipulate or
add noise to the content of collected sensory data when he
is apprehensive about sensor data abuse in certain sensing
applications. Typical data manipulation approaches include
rounding the values in the sensory data to approximate values,
replacing particular sensor readings by previously-recorded
readings, and adding random noise to the sensory data.
However, as mentioned earlier, unlike many previous attacks,
PinMe relies on several macro-level features extracted from
sensory data. As a result, it is robust against several potential
sources of noise. For example, for planeTracker described in
Section III-B3, it only extracts the aviation phases of the plane
from noisy acceleration readings (as apposed to the actual
displacement) from which it estimates the flight duration. As
shown in Fig. 6 (Fig. 7), planeTracker was able to find a set
of three routes (airports) that includes the actual flight route
(destination airport), with a high level of accuracy, even when
the approximated duration and elevation are assumed to be
inaccurate due to the presence of noise (up to 10% for flight
duration and 5m for elevation).
Adding significant noise to sensory readings or replacing
data with previously-recorded data may significantly reduce
the utility of trusted applications relying on such sensory data.
D. Turn-off switch
A hardware turn-off switch that lets the user quickly and
easily turn off all sensors or a sensor-free mode implemented
in the operating system in which no application can obtain
sensory information enables the user to easily stop information
leakage when he suspects that there might be privacy risks. For
example, the user can turn off all sensors when he is driving
to ensure that no application can track him.
VI. RELATED WORK
Several prior research studies have demonstrated the use of
smartphone sensors in diverse application domains. The use
of accelerometer for activity monitoring has been widely dis-
cussed in the literature [48]–[51]. Furthermore, recent research
articles have discussed the feasibility of using air pressure
measurements for indoor positioning [52], [53], in particular,
floor detection.
Moreover, as briefly mentioned in Section I, a few recent
research efforts have demonstrated the feasibility of obtaining
valuable information about the smartphone’s location without
accessing the GPS. In the following, we discuss them in more
detail.
PowerSpy [17] demonstrated that an adversary can estimate
the user’s location by processing the power consumption infor-
mation of the device when he is driving through a known set
of routes. As mentioned in [17], this user location mechanism
has the following limitations: (i) it requires a massive training
dataset of power profiles associated with GPS coordinates,
(ii) since the power profiles of different smartphones vary
significantly from each other, in order to construct the training
dataset, the attacker needs to measure the power consumption
of many devices while driving, (iii) it assumes that there is
enough variability in the device’s power consumption along
a route such that it exhibits unique features, (iv) it is only
applicable to Android devices, and (v) it is able to detect
the complete driving path in only 45% of the trials in the
in the best-case scenario using HTC Desire for data collection
and a small set of possible routes (the estimation accuracy
significantly worsened when other smartphones were used in
the experiment).
ACComplice [19] showed that continuous measurements of
acceleration in smartphones can reveal user location while
driving. It has four main limitations: (i) it requires a train-
ing dataset that contains data on multiple car trips through
each potential traveling route, with the smartphone constantly
collecting motion sensor data, (ii) since it mainly relies on
smartphone’s acceleration data, the noise in sensor readings,
e.g, due to different road conditions, can significantly affect
its accuracy, (iii) it returns several (usually more than 10)
potential driving paths, and (iv) device acceleration needs to be
measured at a relatively high frequency (30Hz). We attempted
to implement ACComplice [19]. However, we observed that
the accelerometer measurements alone were extremely noisy
and led to results that were much weaker than those reported in
[19]. Hence, for a fair comparison, we simply use the accuracy
reported in that paper in our comparison. In [19], ACComplice
is evaluated using only two driving paths. When the initial
point was not given to the algorithm, for each test, it was
able to return two clusters of possible starting points (each
including five points) such that the starting point was within
one of the clusters. Knowing the initial location, it could only
partially find the driving paths (it correctly found 18 out of 23
routes for one test case and 9 out of 12 routes for the other).
Narain et al. [47] demonstrated that an Android app can
infer traveled routes, without the users’ knowledge, using
gyroscope, accelerometer, and magnetometer readings. In their
attack, gyroscope readings have been used as the main source
of data. Further, accelerometer and magnetometer readings
have been utilized to reduce noise and refine the results. Their
proposed approach has four main limitations: (i) the attack re-
turns 10 potential driving paths, (ii) in real-world experiments,
they report a probability of only 30% of inferring a list of 10
routes containing the true route, (iii) the proposed algorithm
only works for driving, and (iv) since this attack requires a
very high sampling rate (20 − 100Hz), their application can
be easily marked as “malicious” using the approach described
in [21].
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TABLE VII: Comparison of different user-tracking mechanisms
Tracking mechanism #Activity Prior info. Training OS Sampling freq. Device/Vehicle dependence
PowerSpy [17] 1 Y Y Andorid N/A Y
ACComplice [19] 1 Y Y Android and iOS 30Hz Y
Tracking Metro [18] 1 Y Y Android and iOS 10Hz N/A
From Pressure [20] 1 Y N N/A 30Hz N
Narain et al. [47] 1 N N Android 20-100 Y
RIG [9] 1 Y N Android 50Hz N
PinMe 4 N N Android and iOS 5Hz (0.1Hz for driving) N
Zhou et al. [9] discussed an attack based on acoustic
information leakage from another application. Their approach
processes the sequence of acoustic data generated by the
smartphone’s speaker when the user is driving and using a
navigational application. This attack does not depend on the
vehicle and device, and constructing real-world attack-specific
dataset (it constructs a dataset based on simulations). However,
they assume that attacker knows the user’s start location or a
place on his route and the rough area he goes (e.g., city) to
find some points of interest and implicitly ignore the possible
loops/rerouting. Furthermore, if the user goes to unlabeled
places that is not likely to be included in the constructed
dataset of points of interest (for example, if he parks his
vehicle far from a point of interest), the approach discussed in
[9] is unable to return the user’s trajectory. In addition, using
the approach described in [21], this attack can be detected
due to its high high sampling rate (50Hz). Finally, if the
user simply turns off the speech guidance mechanism of the
navigation application, this attack is not applicable anymore.
Ho et al. [20] presented an approach that uses dynamic
time warping (DTW) algorithms (i.e., a time-series alignment
algorithm in which two signals are compared against each
other by means of a cost matrix) to track a vehicle using
air pressure readings sampled at 30Hz. DTW is used to
compare the sequence of air pressure data samples with that
of different candidate paths. However, in real-world scenarios,
unfortunately, the search space of all candidate paths can
be very large. If path loops are included, the search space
may be infinite. They assumed that the path does not contain
any loop and examined two DTW-based methods. For the
first one, the median error is reported to be around 800m
(when median error for a random walk was only 1600m).
Considering prior knowledge about the user to limit the area
of interest and reduce search complexity, the second algorithm
offers a median error of 60m. However, as mentioned in [20],
the second approach does not scale well for large maps.
Hua et al. [18] demonstrated that acceleration data can
provide valuable location-related information when the user is
traveling on a train. As mentioned in [18], the tracking method
has two main limitations: (i) similar to the above-mentioned
methods, it requires a large training dataset collected by the
attacker while traveling through different potential paths, and
(ii) it is difficult to provide a high level of location estimation
accuracy due to various types of noise in the training data.
Table VII compares different location mechanisms and
highlights the advantages of PinMe. Our experimental results
indicate that, without knowing the initial location, PinMe was
able to return a single accurate driving path that is very similar
to the trajectory provided by GPS readings. We believe that
PinMe is able to return very accurate results since it mainly
relies on noise-robust features extracted from barometer and
magnetometer measurements. Moreover, unlike previously-
proposed mechanisms, PinMe does not require measurements
on a set of possible routes in advance. Therefore, our pro-
posed attack is also more scalable. Unlike PinMe, the above-
mentioned attacks only estimate the user’s location during
a single activity. Moreover, they commonly assume that the
adversary has substantial prior information about the user’s ini-
tial location. This knowledge is required because the attacker
needs to collect a set of sensory data for different potential
routes in advance and construct an attack-specific training
database (e.g., in [17]) or the location estimation algorithm
does not scale well for a large area of interest (e.g., in [20]).
VII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss three items not yet explained
in detail. First, we discuss limitations of the proposed mech-
anism. Second, we describe how we took advantage of the
interdependence between activities in our algorithms. We then
discuss how PinMe can also be used as a stand-alone location
mechanism, and how it can be used to enhance the security
of autonomous vehicles.
A. Limitations
Next, we briefly discuss four potential limitations of PinMe.
PinMe uses the history of smartphone IP addresses to infer
the last city in which the user was connected to a WiFi
network. In fact, it assumes that the user is directly connected
to the Internet. Thus, if the user utilizes an anonymous com-
munication service, e.g., Tor [54], PinMe may fail to locate
the user. However, as mentioned later, the interdependence
between activities can be used to resolve this limitation.
Moreover, PinMe relies significantly on the variability of
elevations and route directions. Therefore, PinMe might be
unable to estimate the user’s location if the user only moves
in grid routes, e.g., some parts of Manhattan, NY, in which the
roads are almost flat and parallel to each other. Furthermore,
since PinMe relies on publicly-available datasets, the existence
of erroneous data in auxiliary datasets given to PinMe may
reduce the location estimation accuracy. For example, OSM
navigational maps do not typically include very recent con-
structions/detours. Therefore, if the user travels through a new
road that has not been added to the map, PinMe may fail to
track the user.
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Despite the above-mentioned limitations, PinMe presents a
significant advance in state-of-the-art smartphone-based user
location, since it enables an attacker to scale up the attack
against location privacy by minimizing attack requirements
and offers a high location estimation accuracy.
B. Interdependence of activities
As described earlier in Section III-B3, we designed four
different independent algorithms for tracking the user during
four different activities. Although the user’s activities may
seem independent of each other at first glance, there exists
an interdependence between them due to physical constraints
imposed by the world and the user’s movement.
In particular, we make two observations. First, the users
always walk between other activities (driving, traveling on
a train, and traveling on a plane), and therefore, certain
sequences of activities are not feasible. For example, the user
cannot get on a plane as soon as he stops driving. This helps
our tailored classifier algorithm to remove impossible cases.
Second, the final location of the user after performing
each activity roughly determines the initial location of the
next activity. However, since the precision of the estimated
location determined by different algorithms might differ from
each other, combining the results from different algorithms
to get an accurate trajectory is not usually straightforward.
For example, consider the following scenario: a user takes
a flight that lands at airport A, then walks for a few hun-
dred meters to reach his car, and eventually drives to his
home from the airport. In order to track the user, PinMe
utilizes flightTracker, walkingUserTracker, and carTracker,
respectively. flightTracker returns departure and destination
airports, whereas carTracker and walkingUserTracker return
a trajectory with an accuracy comparable to GPS. If PinMe
relies on the assumption that the initial location for each
activity is accurately determined by the previous activity, then
it fails to provide an accurate estimation of the user’s trajectory
in the above-mentioned scenario since the location returned
by the first activity provides an inaccurate initial point for
carTracker (the whole airport area is marked as a single point
with fixed GPS coordinates on navigational maps). However,
the interdependence between activities still provides valuable
pieces of information in this scenario. First, flightTracker
returns the destination airport from which the current city
can be identified even if the user has not connected to any
WiFi network yet or is using an anonymous communication
service, e.g., Tor [54]. Second, the final location of the user
after performing each activity can significantly bound our area
of interest. This has been used in our end-to-end evaluation,
where the walkingUserTracker algorithm assumes that the
user’s initial location, when he starts walking, is within a
small area around the final location of the user estimated by
carTracker.
C. PinMe as an alternative to GPS
Next, we first describe drawbacks of traditional GPS sys-
tems. We then describe why PinMe can offer a more secure
navigation mechanism for autonomous vehicles.
With the widespread use of GPS receivers in modern
vehicles, ranging from yachts to autonomous cars, the security
of GPS has garnered ever-increasing attention in recent years.
GPS receivers compare timestamped signals from a constella-
tion of satellites, inferring their position through computations
on the lightspeed lag from each signal. Several research
studies [55]–[57] have demonstrated the feasibility of faking
the satellite signals needed for positioning and mentioned that
security attacks against the GPS signals used in autonomous
vehicles may lead to disastrous consequences.
Unfortunately, protecting GPS signals against spoofing is
difficult for three reasons. First, the computational load as-
sociated with cryptographic signatures on the signal is high.
Second, it is impossible to use a challenge-response protocol
since the communication channel between the satellites and
GPS receiver is unidirectional, i.e., the receiver cannot trans-
mit data to the satellites. Third, the implementation of new
algorithms/mechanisms, which need modifications to the GPS
infrastructure, is difficult and costly.
As demonstrated in Section IV, PinMe was able to ac-
curately (comparable to GPS) locate the user during differ-
ent activities. A slightly modified version of PinMe can be
implemented on autonomous vehicles, e.g., driverless cars,
as a stand-alone in-vehicle positioning system. For example,
air pressure and heading sensors can be added to driverless
vehicles, enabling sensory data to be processed by on-vehicle
processing units. Odometer readings are easily accessible to
in-vehicle processing units and can be used to further improve
the accuracy of PinMe. Since PinMe does not collect sensory
data from any remote sources, it is resilient against remote
attacks, assuming that navigational/elevation maps provided
by Google [26] and weather reports given by The Weather
Channel [28] are accurate.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper highlighted the unintended consequences of let-
ting third-party applications access smartphone’s presumably
non-critical data. We proposed an attack on location privacy
in which the attacker (i) needs no prior knowledge of the
area of interest, (ii) does not need to construct an attack-
specific training dataset, and (iii) does not collect data at a
high sampling rate.
We demonstrated that there is no need to construct an attack-
specific dataset to compromise location privacy. Evaluation of
the proposed user-location mechanism demonstrated that it is
feasible to gain sensitive information about the user’s location
without accessing location services, e.g., GPS. It suggests that
the threat of unintended information leakage on the location
of smartphone owners is far beyond what is currently thought
possible. Indeed, even seemingly benign sensory/non-sensory
data gathered by a smartphone can leak critical information
about the user. Therefore, they should be proactively protected
from third-party applications.
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